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For a long time, the world thought that the collapse of the USSR in 1991 would lead to a similar 
outcome in North Korea. Although the Kim regime suffered harsh economic troubles, it was able to 
distance itself from communism without facing an ideological crisis and losing mass support. The 
same core political myths are still in use today. However, after the DPRK left the ideas of socialist 
realism behind, it has become clearer that the ideology of the country is a political religion. Now, its 
propaganda is using more supernatural elements than ever before. A good example is the movie The 
Big-Game Hunter (Maengsu sanyangkkun) in which the Japanese are trying to desacralize Paektu 
Mountain, but instead experience the fury of the holy mountain in the form of thunderbolts. The 
movie was produced in 2011 by P’yo Kwang, one of the most successful North Korean directors. 
It was filmed in the same year Kim Chŏng-ŭn came to power. The aim of the paper is to show the 
evolution of the DPRK political myth in North Korean cinema, in which The Big-Game Hunter 
seems to be another step in the process of mythologization. It is crucial to understand how the 
propaganda works, as it is still largely the cinema that shapes the attitudes and imagination of 
the people of the DPRK.
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Introduction
For an observer of North Korean cinema, one of the most fascinating things is how 
little has changed over time. Today, films are in color, the actors are less theatrical, 
and the camera moves more smoothly. In 2012, digital cameras were introduced into 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and mostly replaced the film 




stock 35mm standard. There has been technical progress in the industry. However, 
the plots remain almost the same as 70 years ago. This is intriguing when taking into 
account that the stability of the state has staggered many times throughout history: 
through the loss of the Korean War, the collapse of the regime’s main sponsor (Soviet 
Union) in 1991, the death of the founder Kim Il-sŏng1 (1994) and the succession of 
Kim Chŏng-il (2011), the great North Korean famine (1994–1998), and more re-
cently, the harsh economic sanctions.
Despite various predictions,2 the regime has remained in power with its dominant 
discourse almost untouched. For example, the first movie ever produced in the coun-
try, My Home Village (Nae kohyang), directed in 1949 by Kang Hong-sik and written 
by Kim Sung-gu, tells the story of a peasant who, unable to endure the atrocities on 
the part of Japanese invaders, joins the communist partisans. From them he learns 
about the great general Kim Il-sŏng who is going to bring salvation to all Koreans. 
The movie ends with the victory over the Japanese and a promise of a new era. My 
Home Village created a model screenplay for an entire film genre. Still today, DPRK 
partisan films are one of the most commonly produced genres. As Charles Armstrong 
emphasizes, the anti-Japanese struggle is the “foundational myth of the DPRK.”3 It 
corresponds to the social demand for the figure of an enemy, and it presents the ar-
rival of a messiah. Even the last scenes of My Home Village show an archival display 
of the speech of the young Kim Il-sŏng. Thus, the anti-Japanese struggle myth justi-
fied the current political system. This strong link between the myth and the state, as 
Ernst Cassirer has warned,4 led to the establishment of a cinema of an exceptionally 
totalitarian and hermetic character.
However, there have been some slight changes in the narrative of political myth 
in cinema, especially during the last thirty years. The progressive deification of the 
leaders and the appearance of supernatural elements can be observed. Although much 
has been written on communism as a religious phenomenon,5 one might find a con-
tradiction between the communist leader model in socialist realist aesthetics and the 
current image in North Korea, especially since the country still considers itself as an 
atheistic state and is hostile to organized religion, especially to Christianity.6
1 In this text McCune’a-Reischauer Korean language Romanization systems is used.
2 V. Cha, The Impossible State. North Korea, Past and Future, New York 2014, pp. 1–19.
3 C.K. Armstrong, The Origins of North Korean Cinema: Art and Propaganda in the Democratic 
People’s Republic, “Acta Koreana” 2002, vol. 5, p. 10.
4 E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State, London 1946.
5 For example: A.J. Klinghoffer, Red Apocalypse: The Religious Evolution of Soviet Communism, 
Maryland 1996; R. Imos, Wiara człowieka radzieckiego, Kraków 2007.
6 One must be aware of the ambiguous character of DPRK religious policy. There are churches in 
Pyongyang controlled by the state-run Chosŏn Christian Association. The organization even translated 
the Bible in 1983. These activities, however, have the character of a façade. Chŏng Sŏng-ku, Sahoejuŭi 
kukka sogesŏŭi chonggyo: puk’anŭi kidokkyowa hyanghu sŏn’gyohwaltong panghyange kwanhan sarye 
yŏn’gu, PhD dissertation, Kyonggi University, 1998, pp. 27–55. Access in: Hankuk University of Foreign 
Studies.
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Evolution of the mythological landscape
In general, Soviet art has been an important reference point for all North Koreans. 
During the postwar occupation (1945–1958), the Soviets supported the growth of the 
local cinema and Russian movies dominated the market completely. Many went to 
study film in Moscow.7 DPRK artists officially adopted patterns of socialist realism, 
known in Korea as sahoejuŭijŏk sashilchuŭi. Socialist realism became an official 
artistic method of the Soviet Union in 1934. It aimed to present “reality in its revo-
lutionary development” and teach society the ways of socialism.8 In one respect it 
was a method of promoting ideological principles of Marxism and Leninism, and in 
another a means of control of the ruling party.9 There is no doubt that North Korea 
adopted the totalitarian aspect of the style, and parts of its aesthetics,10 but the extent 
of how much ideology it absorbed is a topic of discussion. While in Soviet cinema 
the influence of socialist realism declined after the death of Stalin, researchers still 
associate the cinema of the DPRK with it.11 However, some differ in their assess-
ments of the phenomenon.
Brian Reynolds Myers put forward a thesis that the principles of socialist realism 
were unsuccessful in North Korea. In Han Sŏrya and North Korean Literature: The 
Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK he argues that the main North Korean writ-
ers (and the DPRK’s Federation of Literature and Art which was connected to the 
film industry) referred to communism very superficially and instead “had returned to 
the ideals of a mythologized colonial past.”12 According to Myers, it is hard to find 
something more contrary to Marxist discourse than the cult of the Korean race and 
the praise of naivety (sobak ham). Frank Hoffmann claims that North Korean aesthet-
ics, especially initially, were a mixture of Soviet and Japanese colonial influences.13 
Indeed, DPRK cinema includes many motifs, such as a mountain as the symbol of 
national identity, a leader of divine origin, the purity of the nation, and the readiness 
for suicide in battle which resembles the ideology of Imperial Japan. On the other 
hand, some scholars still consider North Korean art as just another form of socialist 
realism.14
7 C.K. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 10–14.
8 Pervyĭ vsesoi͡ uznyĭ s”ezd sovetskikh pisateleĭ. Stenograficheskiĭ otchët, “Sovetskiĭ pisatel” 1990, 
Moskva.
9 M. Flig, Mitotwórcza funkcja kina i literatury w kulturze stalinowskiej lat 30. XX wieku, Kraków 
2014, pp. 54–63.
10 About socialist realism cinema esthetic see: T. Lubelski, Historia kina polskiego. Twórcy, filmy, 
konteksty, Chorzów 2008, pp. 41–67; B. Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dic-
tatorship, and Beyond, Princeton 1992.
11 See e.g., S. Chung, Split Screen Korea Shin Sang-ok and Postwar Cinema, London 2014.
12 B.R. Myers, Han Sŏrya and North Korean Literature: The Failure of Socialist Realism in the 
DPRK, New York 1994, p. 53.
13 F. Hoffmann, Brush, Ink and Props. The Birth of Korean Painting, [in:] Exploring North Korean 
Arts, R. Frank (ed.), Vienna 2010, pp. 150–155.
14 T. Gabroussenko, Soldiers on the Cultural Front: Developments in the Early History of North 
Korean Literature and Literary Policy, Honolulu 2010, pp. 5–12.
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The important thing to remember is that Koreans interpreted many communist 
ideas in their own way, and after the fall of the Soviet Union the regime was able 
distance itself from communism altogether without losing credibility. In 1992, all 
references to Marxism and Leninism were removed from the constitution.15 In fact, 
the country no longer uses the word “communism” (kongsanjuŭi) and claims that its 
political system is a “Socialism of Our Own Version” (urishik sahoejuŭi).16 These 
actions strengthened rather than changed the extant national myths.
Emile Durkheim notes how power and holiness are closely related.17 After 1991, 
the exaltation of the leaders accelerated. The language of propaganda increasing-
ly suggested miraculous and magical characteristics of both Kim Il-sŏng and Kim 
Chŏng-il.18 According to a high-ranking defector, Hwang Chang-yŏp, after the death 
of the Great Leader in 1994 the state media reported that white cranes (an animal very 
important in Korean mythology) came to mourn him and that his image suddenly ap-
peared in the sky.19 As Polish sociologist Stefan Czarnowski points out, “Heroes are 
the dead elevated to divine dignity.”20 In 1997, the government changed the calendar 
to chuch’e time (literally “subject time”) to begin counting the years from Kim Il-
sŏng’s birth.21 “The tremendous event that occurred at the beginning of time” which 
constructs “the Cosmos” and “sacred history” as described by Mircea Eliade22 turns 
out to occur, for the DPRK, in the 20th century. A year later, the People’s Supreme 
Assembly gave the deceased leader the title of “president for all eternity,” and since 
then, no one else can hold the office of President.23 In this way, Kim Il-sŏng shed his 
last human qualities and transformed into a mythical figure.
This trend of sacralization can be also observed in cinema. As the visual arts are 
great carriers of myths, they were a central task for the DPRK artists from the begin-
ning. In the first years of the DPRK, Kim Il-sŏng was portrayed in cinema primarily 
15 Ch’oe Yŏng-un, Puk’an chŏngch’iŭi chonggyohwae taehan yŏn’gu, PhD dissertation, Ewha 
Womans University, 2001, p. 27. Access in: Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. One may find infor-
mation about chuch’e (subject) as DPRK national ideology, but others see it just as a part of Kim Il-sŏng’s 
personality cult created in order to present the leader as an intellectual and theoretician, no worse than 
Mao. The authors do not consider chuch’e thought as a good tool for understanding DPRK cinema, as it 
is vague and hides the true intentions of filmmakers. See more: B.R. Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth, 
Busan 2015.
16 Kim Kyong-dong, Lee On-jook, The Two Koreas. Social Change and National Integration, Seoul 
2003, p. 334.
17 B. Gustafsson, Durkheim on Power and Holiness, [in:] The Myth of the State, H. Biezais (ed.), 
Uppsala 1972, pp. 20–30.
18 W.J. Dziak, Korea Północna. U źródeł rodzinnej sukcesji władzy, Warszawa 2009, pp. 285–286; 
R. Husarski, Szamanizm Wielkiego Brata, “Tygodnik Powszechny” 2016, nr 41, pp. 44–45.
19 Hwang Chang-yŏp, Puk’anŭi in’gwŏnmunje, http://korea318.com/client/board/data/view.asp?sidx 
=134 [access: 1.10.2018].
20 S. Czarnowski, Kult bohaterów i jego społeczne podłoże. Święty Patryk, bohater narodowy 
Irlandii, Warszawa 1956, pp. 17–25.
21 The current year would be “chuch’e 108.” See: V. Cha, op. cit., p. 39.
22 M. Eliade, Cosmos and History. The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. W.R. Trask, New York 
1959, pp. VII–VIII.
23 Kang Chol-hwan, P. Rigolot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in North Korean Gulags, 
New York 2005, p. 7.
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as a great general and liberator of the nation. He was rarely depicted on screen by an 
actor. Usually, as in My Home Village, propagandists use some archival documentary 
clips or photos. One of the few known attempts to portray the leader through an actor 
was in the ten-part movie The Star of Korea (Chosŏnŭi pyŏl, started in 1980, directed 
by Om Gil-son). The final episode was broadcast in 1987.24 As it was characterized, 
with time, the image of the national hero began to expand. One of the foundations of 
mythological thinking is mystery.25 When a leader becomes someone who is beyond 
human, the filmmakers completely refrain from portraying him on screen. After-
wards, the leader appears only in other, indirect ways. In the sacred story, the deeds 
of gods and heroes are a mystery.26
The question for the directors was how to portray the leaders, to show that they are 
always present with the people. The characters in movies speak about Kim Il-sŏng 
in a sublime manner, they are moved by the sound of his name, and they can change 
their behaving just by hearing about his greatness. Song of the East Sea (Tonghaeŭi 
norae, 2009, the director is not credited) tells the story of the formative years of the 
Chongryon (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), an organization 
of North Koreans in Japan. The Koreans who are persecuted by the cruel Japanese 
are shown regaining hope from a letter received from Kim Il-sŏng himself. In another 
scene, the whole community loudly cries with emotion as a portrait of the com-
mander is hung and anointed. In the movie Bellflower (Toraji Kkot¸ 1987, dir. Kyun 
Son-jo) a poor village receives a convoy of new tractors as a present from Kim Il-
sŏng. Although he is physically absent, the leader is omnipresent.27 He always knows 
what is best and provides for the people with love and care. To describe him, this 
propaganda uses the mother figure.28 As Joseph Campbell unfolds the archetype of 
the mother in his famous book:
Human beings are born too soon; they are unfinished, unready as yet to meet the world. Con-
sequently, their whole defense from a universe of dangers is the mother, under whose protec-
tion the intra-uterine period is prolonged […]. Any prolonged absence of the parent causes 
tension in the infant and consequent impulses of aggression.29
24 According to North Korean film historian Johannes Schönherr: “The actor playing Kim is not 
named in the credits and is said to have undergone plastic surgery in order to look exactly like the young 
Kim. He’s also said to have not been allowed to appear in any other film again;” J. Schönherr, North 
Korean Cinema. A History, North Carolina 2012, p. 65.
25 A. Szyjewski, Etnologia religii, Kraków 2016, p. 88.
26 M. Eliade, Le sacré et le profane, Paris 1987, pp. 84–85.
27 Lee Hyang-jin analysis the movie from Marxism-juche perspective and finds “various contradictory 
messages undermining its surface text.” Not surprising as the authors of the movie were guided by different 
ideology in the first place. See: Lee Hyang-jin, Conflicting Working-Class Identities in North Korean 
Cinema, “Korea Journal” 2000, vol. 40, no. 3, p. 249.
28 It was widely described for the first time by Brian Reynolds Myers. Also Polish film theorist 
Jerzy Franczak notices feminine features in the DPRK cinema. He even calls the common plot narra-
tion as “erotic” – the entrance of a hero in to the ideological frames resembles the passion of lovers. 
B.R. Myers, The Cleanest Race. How North Koreans See Themselves – And Why It Matters, New York 
2010, pp. 73–95; J. Franczak, Drewniany język (O kinie Północnej Korei), “Nowe Nawigacje” 2003, 
vol. 2, p. 58.
29 J. Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, New Jersey 2004, p. 36.
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Foreigners seem to be a threat to this intimate relationship between the leader 
and the people. It should be remembered that even the Soviets and the Chinese, who 
contributed so much to the survival of the DPRK, are almost never mentioned in the 
cinema (in contrast, for example, with the Polish socialist realist cinema in which 
the Soviets are praised). In war movies, the Koreans usually fight by themselves un-
der the general Kim Il-sŏng. However, the Great Leader is never depicted as someone 
who gives out orders on screen. He is more like a totem, a unifying symbol for the 
people.30 The greatest act of heroism was depicted as a soldier dying in a suicide at-
tack with the name of the commander on his lips (e.g., My Happiness, 1987, directed 
by Kim Yong-ho).
After the death of Kim Il-sŏng, his son’s cult grew in a mysterious way. In the times 
of increasing lack of supplies, Kim Chŏng-il become associated with land, harvest and 
weather. Propaganda reported on various mysterious phenomena surrounding the Dear 
Leader. During a visit to the demilitarized zone in Panmunjom, he brought the fog to 
cover himself against American snipers, but when he reached the soldiers, the fog 
suddenly disappeared. He could repair a tractor door just by touching it, after which 
no one could ever open it again.31 He could bring out the sun for important meetings.32 
These types of messages are also portrayed on screen. In the movie Forever in Our 
Memory (Ch’uŏksoge yŏngwŏnhari) directed by Kang Chung-mo in 1999, villagers 
and soldiers are struggling to cultivate the fields during a drought. In one sequence, 
an excited woman screams that the Dear General himself was approaching the vil-
lage. All of the workers leave the field and run toward her in excitement. The next 
shot shows clouds of dust behind the car, disappearing on the horizon. The Koreans 
are so moved that they cry over the tracks of their beloved leader’s car. The sequence 
finishes with a long shot of clouds, signalling the end of the drought.
For some scholars, both South Korean and from outside the peninsula, similar 
examples of propaganda were enough to deduce that in North Korea, the Kim dy-
nasty is godlike, or resembling God.33 Others warn against drawing conclusions too 
quickly and note that propaganda is usually not direct in making claims of divinity of 
the leaders. Brian Reynolds Myers, an expert on DPRK literature, even writes:
30 This omniscience and omnipresence of the leader is similar to representations of Stalin in Soviet 
classics like The Fall of Berlin (Padenie Berlina, directed by Mikheil Chiaureli in 1950). Apart from 
the fact that Stalin is very masculine figure, he is also presented as a teacher and liberator of the nations, 
while Kim is presented in a purely nationalistic manner. He is more of a protector of the people, than the 
educator.
31 The tractor incident was probably inspired by Mikheil Chiaureli’s documentary film The Vow 
(Kliatva, 1946). In the movie Stalin comes to the workers struggling with a broken tractor, and quickly 
identifies which part was damaged. The difference is that Stalin was portrayed as a genius and Kim as 
magician. See: Anecdotes of Kim Jong Il’s Life, Pyongyang 2012, pp. 3–8.
32 Ibidem.
33 e.g., Kim Pyŏng-ro, Puk’ansahoeŭi chonggyosŏng: chuch’esasanggwa kidokkyoŭi chonggyo-
yangshik pigyo, Seoul 2000, pp. 4–6; V. Cha, op. cit., p. 39.
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A significant difference is that while the Text likes to draw bemused attention to outsiders, in-
cluding Americans and South Koreans, who allegedly regard Kim Il Sung as a divine being, it 
never makes such claims for him itself.34
Although one could argue with this statement, considering some of the materials 
already known,35 it is true that propaganda mostly uses suggestion and implication 
about the nature of the leaders. In Forever in Our Memory, the viewer cannot be cer-
tain if the sudden change in the disastrous weather is really the work of Kim Chŏng-il, 
even though the film’s narrative implies it. However, a closer study of DPRK cin-
ematic history reveals the process of the sacralization of the leaders. It appears that 
the movie The Big-Game Hunter (Maengsu sanyangkkun) takes this process a step 
further. In this film there are no understatements. To use Mircea Eliade’s language 
the “sacred cosmos” of North Korea is manifest in the movie very clearly.
About the movie
The Big-Game Hunter was produced in 2011, the year of the transfer of power from 
Kim Chŏng-il, following his death, to his son, Kim Chŏng-ŭn. The movie was di-
rected by P’yo Kwang, the former director of photography who specializes in histori-
cal cinema.36 His movie, set in the Middle Ages about a Korean family defending 
the Dokdo Islands37 from the Japanese and featuring the North Korean movie star Ri 
Yŏng-ho, The Blood-Stained Route Map (P’imudŭn yakp’ae) received recognition 
even in South Korea. Along with another P’yo Kwang movie, The Spirit of Korean 
Celadon (Ch’ŏngjaŭi nŏk, 2002), it was screened at the Jeonju International Film 
Festival at the Special Screening section in 2005. It was the second time in his-
tory that movies from the DPRK were screened to a South Korean audience – after 
Souls Protest (sarainnŭn yŏnghondŭl, 2000, directed by Kim Chun-song) which was 
shown in the South in 2003.38 P’yo Kwang’s greatest success was probably the movie 
Pyongyang Nalpharam, made in 2006. In this martial arts drama, once again starring 
Ri Yŏng-ho, the hero fights back against the Japanese and defends Korean independ-
ence. The DPRK state media reported that this movie was seen by six million people 
in the country.39 The Big-Game Hunter was the director’s tenth movie.40 Considering 
34 B.R. Myers, The Cleanest Race…, op. cit., p. 111.
35 “In children’s book Kim Il Sung becomes invisible, travel vast distances in a single night, and 
appears in two different places at the same time;” S.W. Linton, Life after Death in North Korea, [in:] 
Korea Briefing. Toward Reunification, D.R. McCann (ed.), London 1997, pp. 83–109.
36 Yŏnghwajinhŭngwiwŏnhoe, Han’gukyŏnghwayŏn’gam, Seoul 2012, pp. 439–440.
37 The islands are subject to an international dispute between Korea and Japan.
38 Chosun, ‘tokto waegu kyŏkt’oe’ puk’anyŏnghwa ‘p’imudŭn yakp’ae’ kungnae sangyŏng, http://
news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2005/04/12/2005041270173.html [access: 1.10.2018].
39 J. Schönherr, op. cit., p. 164.
40 It was recommended to this paper’s author at the XIV Pyongyang Movie Festival by a shop clerk 
when he asked about contemporary film popular among Koreans.
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P’yo Kwang’s position and achievements, it can be said that he is probably the most 
powerful man in the DPRK cinema industry.
The Big-Game Hunter takes place during the colonial period, somewhere between 
1936–1939. The action film is based on the presumably true story of the Japanese 
expeditions led by general Tomoyuki Yamashita which desecrated the mountains of 
Korea by hammering steel bars blessed by Shinto priests into the tops of the moun-
tains. According to some, such activities were intended to assert the dominance of the 
Yamato race on the Korean Peninsula and squash the hopes for Korean independence. 
Presented as true history in the movie, the only factual part of the story is based on 
the real bars found in the mountains. Other scholars offer less mysterious explana-
tions of their existence: e.g., they could have been put there for measuring the land, or 
for military use, such as building a temporary military base. However, such nuances 
would not serve the anti-Japanese myth.41
The main character, Kim Ko-sŏk, is a former soldier of the Korean Army which 
was disbanded in August 1907 as a result of a secret meeting between the Korean 
and Japanese governments after the abdication of the Korean Emperor, Ko Chong – 
although in the movie there is no information that most of the army was already dis-
banded after the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905.42 After losing the rebellion with the so-
called Righteous Army (Ŭibyŏng) against the Japanese Army, he refuses to continue 
to fight. His wife’s father commits suicide in despair (which may be a reference to 
the famous Korean officer Pak Se-han) and his son becomes ill. He moves with his 
family to live a simple life as a hunter. However, as the result of attempted rape by 
a Japanese landowner, his wife dies. She loses her life by jumping from a cliff while 
trying to escape her attacker. As a result, her ill son dies as well. Furious with revenge, 
Kim Ko-sŏk kills the Japanese landowner and his relatives except for his son Yoshiro, 
although he survives with one less ear. After escaping from the scene of the murder, 
Kim Ko-sŏk changes his name to Chun Pŏm and hides in the mountains with his 
remaining children, Chin-hae and Chin-sŏk.
When his children grow up, Chun Pŏm tries to find a husband for his daughter, 
Chin-hae. During a visit to the village, he is recognized by Yoshiro, now an Imperial 
Army officer, and arrested. The one-eared Japanese soldier wants to kill Kim Ko-sŏk 
but his superiors have different plans. The hunter is to guide a special expedition to 
the top of Mt. Paektu to desecrate the symbol of the Korean spirit, after which he 
would be killed. During the journey Chun Pŏm comes to learn of their plans, and 
he prepares a trap. However, he fails, and his son is killed. He is forced to continue 
the march. In the final scenes, it turns out that the peak to which he took them is not 
Mt. Paektu, and the Japanese fall into an ambush of Korean guerrilla fighters who 
secretly followed behind Chun Pŏm. The last scene shows the Japanese prisoners of 
41 Kim Yong-sam, Yŏksabaroseugiwa panil sŏndong taemoshi toen soemalttung chinshirŭn? 
(22.03.2016), http://m.mediapen.com/news/view/129370 [access: 1.10.2018]; Kim Du-gyu, [Why] [kim-
dugyu kyosuŭi shweljmlinbt(kugunp’ungsu)] chosŏnŭi jwimshin kkŭnŭryŏdŏn jyŏjn soemalttugŭi tto 
tarŭn chinshil, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/09/27/2013092702422.html?Dep0=twit
ter&d=2013092702422 [access: 1.10.2018].
42 About this period learn more: E. Kim, Japanese Rule in Korea (1905–1910): A Case Study, 
“Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society” 1962, vol. 106, no. 1, pp. 53–59.
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war surrendering their weapons to the Kim Il-sŏng partisans and the victorious Mt. 
Paektu.
Messiah, Holy Mountain, and the beasts
The Big-Game Hunter follows a type of plot typical of a North Korean partisan movie. 
The genre was popular throughout the Soviet bloc. However, even in the early years, 
the DPRK version differed from its counterparts in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and 
Poland by the presence of the messianic archetype. One study, analyzing the figures 
of the leaders in several socialist realist movies from different countries, concluded 
that only in North Korea is the leader portrayed “like a demigod” with the attributes 
of omnipresence and omniscience. The difference was also seen in the attitude to-
wards the leader. “Heroes die with the revolution and Kim Il Sung’s name on their 
lips while Soviet heroes only chant the Internationale.”43
However, when classic DPRK movies show partisans announcing the coming of 
a great general and praising him, there remains ambiguity about his nature. In The 
Big-Game Hunter all doubts are dispelled. To use a term from structuralist analysis, 
the general’s signifié was transformed.44 In three different scenes, Koreans pray to-
gether for the arrival of a great man. In the first instance, peasants pray towards the 
sky after the Japanese army burned and slaughtered their relatives. In the background 
a song is heard which says: “Stars are numerous in the vast sky, but no star shines 
for our nation.” As the propaganda expanded, Kim Il-sŏng began to be described not 
only as the sun, but also as a star, and even as Hanullim, the god from Korean folk 
mythology.45 In numerous later scenes, heroes are seen looking up in despair, and in 
the next shot a bright star appears – an unmistakable harbinger of change. Partisans 
who ceased fighting due to a lack of leadership cry out to Mt. Paektu to answer them. 
Finally, Kim Ko-sŏk is seen praying in tears to the holy mountain, after killing the 
blasphemous Japanese, to send the nation a general who will restore the country. Af-
ter this scene, viewers are shown a mountain surrounded by lightning. In a sublime 
tone, the narrator says that at long last the General of Mt. Paektu came and saved 
Korea. Even without appearing on the screen, Kim Il-sŏng is the hero of the mov-
ie. Kim Ko-sŏk, his family, and the partisans, precisely following one of Vladimir 
Propp’s rules presented in Morphology of the Folktale, are secondary heroes whose 
function is to give proper meaning to the hero myth, and the leader himself acts as 
a deus ex machina.46
Supernatural elements are present throughout the movie in various ways. The 
Japanese decide to carry out the desecrating rituals on Mt. Paektu because they came 
to the conclusion that the spirit of the Korean struggle exists only because of the 
power of the mountain. The Japanese are afraid of the prophecy. They conclude that 
43 J. Mahuzier, Exploring Partisan Myth in Totalitarian Cinema, PhD dissertation, Seoul National 
University, 2013, p. 96. Access in: Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
44 M. Czeremski, Struktura mitów. W stronę metonimii, Kraków 2009, pp. 72–84.
45 Ch’oe Yŏng-un, op. cit., pp. 44–45.
46 V. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, Austin 1968, pp. 71–78.
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the strange weather phenomena in the mountains means something is amiss. The 
viewer learns that the Koreans regard it is as the “spirit of a savior given by Mt. Paek-
tu” and believe that this person will surely destroy the Japanese. The colonial forces 
must do something about it, so they arm the expedition with magical artifacts – steel 
which has particles from the sword given by the major Shinto goddess, Amaterasu, 
to the nation of Japan. In another scene, as the expedition is approaching the top of 
the mountain, thunder and lightning appear. The expedition is terrified. One of the 
Japanese soldiers tries to charge toward the peak and dies momentarily from a thun-
derbolt. Chun Pŏm explains that it is because of disrespect. To survive, they must 
proceed with respect and bow to all the “mysterious peaks.”
There are also some scenes which represent “the spirit of the nation.” In these 
scenes, the first-person camera moves quickly through the forest, showing dead Japa-
nese soldiers and presenting Mt. Paektu from a bird’s eye point of view. Although 
this might be considered only an aesthetic technique, it is unusual of most typical 
DPRK movies and socialist realist cinema, which typically avoided overcomplica-
tion of narration in its attempts to be clear enough to be understood by every worker 
and peasant.
It must be noted that Mt. Paektu has been present in movies from the beginning 
of North Korean cinema. The mountain became a logo for the first DPRK movie 
production. It functioned as a symbol of national identity and an important, sym-
bolic landmark. In propaganda the Kim dynasty is also strongly connected to this 
mountain.47 In a classic propaganda text, Kim Il-sŏng leads his partisan campaign 
from it, and Kim Chŏng-il was born at the foot of it. In The Big-Game Hunter, an-
other language shift is noticed. Mt. Paektu undergoes personification. According to 
Stewart Guthrie, if one essential quality for religion must be chosen, it would be 
anthropomorphization.48 Mt. Paektu seems to be a mountain who can send a hero, 
kill those who disrespect it and “any provoker against this ancestral mountain […] 
will never escape the merciless punishment of Mt. Paektu” as the narrator proclaims 
at the end of the movie. Prior to this, the mountain had never been personified this 
way in cinema.
While there is anthropomorphization, the movie also offers some examples of the 
process of dehumanization the movie. The denial of humanity to the “stranger” has 
been a common practice in traditional societies. Andrzej Szyjewski writes:
From their point of view, the world is divided into “real people” – that is, members of their own 
tribe – who speak as “humans” or in a given language, and animals and monsters who in a more 
or less successful way imitate real people. Humans are always us, never them.49
This tribal thinking is the best way to describe the mentality presented on the 
screen. While DPRK propaganda has dehumanized foreigners from the beginning, 
47 About symbolic function of Mt. Paektu in DPRK read: R. Winstanley-Chesters, V. Ten, New 
Goddesses at Paektu Mountain: Two Contemporary Korean Myths, “S/N Korean Humanities” 2016, 
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 151–179.
48 S. Guthrie, A Cognitive Theory of Religion, “Current Anthropology” 1980, vol. 21, no. 2, p. 182.
49 A. Szyjewski, op. cit., p. 63 (translated by R.H.).
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the way it is done in The Big-Game Hunter is worth noting. The main characters are 
hunters. Interestingly, they do not distinguish between the animals they kill and the 
Japanese. Under interrogation about killing the landlord’s family, Kim Ko-sŏk proud-
ly answers: “I killed a beast, not a man.” In another scene, in which one partisan is 
taking his gun and preparing to leave his house, he quiets his wife by arguing that 
he is only leaving to “go hunting.” There is also one hero who was saved by a Japa-
nese person from freezing to death, and it is evident that this contact with strangers 
has caused him to lose his “Koreanness.” He is nervous and petty and puts the other 
characters in danger. Finally, he realizes how naïve he was to trust a Japanese person. 
To purify himself, he kills his former savior and calls him the devil. The propaganda 
is clear: foreigners can never be trusted.
This dichotomy is also emphasized by contact with nature. Koreans have a spe-
cial relationship with the land. They feel confident in forests. Tiredness can never 
be seen on their faces. Chin-hae is depicted as pure: she is happy and innocent even 
after hunting a bear which wounded her. In contrast, the Japanese are clumsy, weak, 
and fearful – one of them at night mistook Chin-sŏk to be a ghost. It can be also read 
as another anthropomorphization that the land of Korea itself rejected the foreigner 
invaders. The differences between the two nations are also emphasized through their 
appearance. Most of the Japanese have some physical defect. One of them is missing 
an ear, others are wrinkled, and some wear glasses or wigs. Koreans, on the other 
hand, stand upright, are well-built and with their round faces are perfect examples of 
the “pure race.” It should also be pointed out that the English title was softened, prob-
ably intentionally, by the Koreans. The direct translation of Maengsu sanyangkkun is 
“Beast Hunter,” and in that way the characters describe the Japanese.
Conclusion
Myths, especially political myths as Ernst Cassirer warned, are dangerous weapons 
in the hands of the state. According to the philosopher, myth has the potential for 
rapid expansion. By using manipulations in the semantic field, it transforms lan-
guage, ethical values, and meanings. It can do so imperceptibly through the help 
of arousing political passions.50 This is why strong emotions are at the center of 
The Big-Game Hunter. Through emotional manipulation the viewer easily accepts 
changes to the mythical worldview, and new aspects of the political myths smoothly 
become part of a newly built whole.
Regardless of whether one agrees on the socialist realist roots of DPRK cinemato-
graphy or not, The Big-Game Hunter has nothing to do with them. Elements such as 
a living mountain, praying characters, prophecies, magic rituals, and race-orientated 
thought are way beyond the aesthetics of socialist realism. Rather than a story about 
class maturation, we are presented with the myth of the hero. Paradoxically, with the 
nation’s slow opening to the outside world, instead of a history that would attempt 
50 E. Cassirer, op. cit., pp. 182–190.
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to adapt to global conditions, a progressive mythologization is developing. It might 
be seen as a weakness of the regime and a result of an identity crisis. For old com-
munists, such as Hwang Chang-yŏp, the supernatural elements in propaganda which 
came about after the death of Kim Il-sŏng were shocking.51 However, one might 
argue that in fact, by creating more sacred and supernatural structures around the re-
gime, its survival was aided. The different testimonies show that, at least partly, this 
transition was successful. Although defectors differ in their views on the nature of 
their former leader, it is common in the country to attribute divine powers to leaders – 
even recently the author of this paper heard such a claim from one of the defectors.
Some scholars argue that this “alternative” to main discourse will lead to a serious 
weakening of the regime and a massive loss of trust in it. As early as in 2007, Andrei 
Lankov warned that the increasingly widespread access to South Korean movies on 
DVD “does not bode well for the regime’s future.”52 Instead, the dictatorship during 
the rule of Kim Chŏng-ŭn is as strong as ever and there is no sign of a rapidly ap-
proaching fall. The rigid and sacred frames of North Korean cinema put them into 
a different category than films from the outside world. DPRK cinematography be-
longs to the sacred arts. It is a carrier of national myths. To echo Ernst Cassirer again, 
words in the hands of the state can be as dangerous as weapons of mass destruction.
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